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Coming off the Bench:
Self-Represented Litigants, Judges and the Adversarial Process
Jennifer Leitch*
In 1976, Abram Chayes explained how a paradigm shift was taking place in civil
litigation. Procedural innovations were linked to a series of substantive changes in the
American legal order that signaled a move away from a traditional private law model of
litigation toward a newer and more expansive public law model of litigation.1 In charting
this shift, Chayes explored a whole new approach to thinking about the legal process
undertaken by judges.

His overall assessment was very much to the point: “our

traditional concept of adjudication and the assumptions on which it is based provide an
increasingly unhelpful, indeed misleading framework for assessing either the workability
or the legitimacy of the role of the judge and the court within this model.”2 Chayes’ work
has had a massive effect upon the development of civil procedure and the adjudicative
process in subsequent decades. His articulation of an expanded conceptualization of the
role of the judge preserved what he believed was the “judiciary’s broader legitimacy by
responding to, indeed by stirring the deep and durable demand for justice in society.”3
In the spirit of Abram Chayes, I want to insist that another paradigm shift is and
should be taking place today. This shift challenges the current efficacy and legitimacy of
the role of both the judge and the courts within an adversarial framework. Once again, to
the extent that the existing legal process fails to serve the demands for justice for those
who engage with it, there is need to rethink and reform the process. This present-day
shift is being brought about by the increasing presence of self-represented litigants in the
* Jennifer Leitch is a Research Fellow at the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice and an Adjunct Professor at
Osgoode Hall Law School and University of Toronto Faculty of Law. I am grateful to Janet Mosher, Allan
Hutchinson, Trevor Farrow, Lisa Moore, Mitchell Perlmutter and Sean Walsh for their critical assistance
and comments.
1

David Kennedy and William Fisher III, eds., The Canon of American Legal Thought (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2006) at 605 at 610-611.
2

Abram Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976), 89:7 Harv. L. Rev. 1281;
Kennedy and Fisher, The Canon of American Legal Thought, ibid. at 605.
3

Chayes, ibid. at 1316; Kennedy and Fisher, ibid. at 610.
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civil ligation process. In some legal settings, self-represented litigants comprise the
overwhelming majority of litigants.4 The reality is, therefore, that self-representation is
becoming as much the norm as the exception.5 This fact alone necessitates a serious reappraisal of the structure and dynamics of the adversarial process. For the majority of
litigants entering the civil justice system without legal training, the organization and
operation of the legal process is, at best, stressful to navigate and, at worst,
indecipherable and inaccessible.

However, when combined with the sense of

disempowerment and disengagement felt by those who attempt to represent themselves
(or do not litigate at all) as well as the emotional challenges associated with selfrepresentation, the need for deep and systemic changes to the adversarial system become
apparent. 6 Without such reform, a large segment of the population will be unable to
exercise their right to be heard and participate in a fair hearing. This undermines the
legitimacy of the adversarial process and the legal institutions more generally.
As such, the need for a revised model of litigation with adversarial footings that
addresses the current model’s failure to include and engage self-represented litigants is of
the highest priority. 7 While there is not yet any agreed-upon notion of what a new
adjudicative or adversarial paradigm might look like, there are signs that one is beginning
to take shape. At a minimum, based upon the number as well as the views of selfrepresented litigants, there are clear indications that, as the traditional model and its
underlying assumptions falter, a fresh appraisal of the litigation process and its operating
assumptions is required.
4

See Julie Macfarlane, “Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants,” Final Report of
the National Self-Represented Litigants Project (May 2013) at 122, available at
www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/For_the_Public/About_the_Law_Society/Convocation_Decisions/2014/Self
-represented_project.pdf.
5

Recent statistics in the United States suggest that 76% of litigants in non-family civil courts are
unrepresented and the vast majority of these litigants are defendants. In the family law context, the number
is closer to 80-90% of litigants being unrepresented. See: Anna E. Carpenter, “Active Judging and Access
to Justice” (unpublished manuscript, February 3, 2017) citing “The Landscape of Civil Litigation in State
Courts” (2015) National Centre for State Courts (Williamsburg, Virginia) at iv, available at
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Research/CivilJusticeReport-2015.ashx.
6

Julie Macfarlane, supra, footnote 4; William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel and Austin Sarat, “The
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming…”(1980-81), 15:3-4 Law & Soc.
Rev. 631.
7

Jennifer Leitch, “Having a Say: Access to Justice as Democratic Participation” (2015), 4:1 U.C.L. J.L. &
J. 76.
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In the first section of this paper, I look at recent judicial examples of how judges
have recognized and begun to respond to the challenge of increasing numbers of selfrepresented litigants. In this sense, members of the judiciary are confronting traditional
assumptions about adjudication and are advocating for new approaches and processes
that take better account of self-representation.

The second section examines the

assumptions that underlie the adversarial process and takes issue with the continued
pertinence and efficacy of these assumptions. In the third section, I canvass the views of
self-represented litigants on the challenges they face within the litigation process. The
fourth section looks at changes that might be made in order to ensure that the adversarial
process and the pivotal role of judges within the adversarial context might work more
fairly. Throughout the paper, I will push through on the understanding that, when it
comes to the adversarial process and the judges who operate within it, passivity is not the
same as impartiality. Rather, if the adversarial process is to remain relevant, neutral and
fair to all those who engage with it, it must embrace a more active role for the judiciary in
dealing with self-represented litigants.
The Adversary System under Pressure
In a recent American example,8 Judge Richard Posner was confronted with the
challenges associated with hearing cases involving self-represented litigants. In that
particular case, Judge Posner undertook his own research relating to issues raised by a
self-represented litigant and disputed by opposing counsel. This was considered by some
to call his role as a neutral decision-maker into question. 9 Specifically, during the
hearing, Judge Posner had searched certain medical websites for information about a
8

Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622 (U.S. C.A. 7th Cir., 2015). Judge Posner recently resigned from the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. In articulating the reasons for his sudden departure, Judge Posner
stated: “I was not getting along with the other judges because I was (and am) very concerned about how the
courts treat pro se litigants, who I believe deserve a better shake.” Subsequent to his departure from the
appellate court, Judge Posner published a book entitled Reforming the Federal Judiciary (self-published
through Amazon on September 7, 2017) in which, among other issues, he seeks to critically examine how
prose litigants are treated by the appellate court. See Debra Wiens, “Why did Posner retire? He cites
‘difficulties’ with his colleagues on one issue”, ABA Journal (September 7, 2017). Available at
www.abajournal.com/news/article.
9

Debra Cassens Weiss, “Dissenter Blasts Posner’s Internet Research in Inmate’s Suit over Acid Reflux
Treatment” (August 20, 2015), ABA Journal, online at
www.abajournal.com/news/article/posners_internet_research_in_inmates_gerd_suit_leads_to_sparring_in_
7th_cir.
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prescription drug that the self-represented prison inmate claimed was being unfairly
administered by staff at the prison in which he was incarcerated.

The prison

administration not only had counsel, but also presented expert testimony respecting the
medication in question; this testimony was at best vulnerable to cross-examination.
Judge Posner’s fellow judges, while concurring in the result, found that Posner’s
independent research was advocating for one side. However, in response, Judge Posner
queried whether “the unreliability of the unalloyed adversary process in a case of such
dramatic inequality of resources and capabilities of the parties as this case is to be an
unalterable bar to justice?”10 He felt that the inmate was ill-equipped to cross-examine
the medical expert evidence presented by the prison administration through its counsel;
this was notwithstanding that the expert evidence was susceptible to challenge in crossexamination.

As such, Judge Posner believed, “it is heartless to make a fetish of

adversary procedure if by doing so feeble evidence is credited because the opponent has
no practical access to offsetting evidence.”11
The criticisms directed at Judge Posner respecting his intervention reflect a
“current reluctance of the judiciary to assist self-represented litigants.”12 This criticism is
rooted in assumptions about the traditionally passive role of the adversarial trial judge
and concerns about bias, which are reflected in American case law that generally refuses
to recognize a duty of judicial assistance.13 Notwithstanding these considerations, the
new reality respecting the scope of self-representation within the civil justice system is
forcing the judiciary to grapple with the question: “How far can a judge go in guiding and
assisting a self-represented litigant in such a way as to avoid the possibly harsh or unjust

10

Weiss, ibid.

11

Weiss, ibid.

12

Jona Goldschmidt, & Loretta Stalans, “Lawyers’ Perceptions of the Fairness of Judicial Assistance to
Self-Represented Litigants” (2010) available at htttp://ssrn.com/abstracts=1444745.
13

Jona Goldschmidt, “Judicial Assistance to Self-Represented Litigants: Lessons from the Canadian
Context” (2006) at 2, available at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judicialethics/
resources/Judicial_Assitance.autocheckdam.pdf. This is notwithstanding recent changes to the American
judicial canons that call for accommodation of self-represented litigants.
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consequences resulting from their lack of familiarity with the judicial process?” 14 In
considering the role of the judge in the adversarial process, Neil Brooks suggested that:
if one party is not represented or if his representation is inadequate...[i]n
such a situation, the adversary system will fail to achieve its
objective…[and] the judge should not hesitate to intervene. Whatever
dangers arise when a judge intervenes in such a situation, they are
outweighed by the serious danger that is present if he does not intervene.15
Canadian judges are being confronted with similar challenges. However, in the
Canadian context, it is recognized that adjudicators need to provide some judicial
assistance in the course of a hearing.

This duty has been articulated in several

decisions.16 In Ontario, MacDonald J. of the Superior Court dismissed a motion for a
mistrial that was based on her having assisted a self-represented party raise issues during
the self-represented litigant’s examination and cross-examination. In her reasons for
dismissing the motion for a mistrial, the trial judge stated,
[t]rial fairness requires ensuring that an unrepresented person is not denied a
trial on the merits by her lack of knowledge of either the trial process or
procedural or substantive law, or by the stress of appearing in court, or by a
combination of those factors. Litigants have the right to appear in court
without counsel and the right to a fair hearing regardless of whether they are
legally represented. Since it is the trial judge who is required to give effect
to those rights, doing so cannot amount to abandonment of the role of the
trial judge and assumption of a counsel-like role.17
MacDonald J.’s concern about trial fairness caused her to conclude that while the
adversarial system in “its purest form” provides a potential advantage to the represented
party who is opposing a self-represented party, such an advantage must be measured
against a commitment to fair trials; it must be deemed fair by “reasonable and informed
observers of the trial process”.18 While tempered by a concern for impartiality and not
14

Ibid at 2.

15

Neil Brooks, “The Judge and the Adversary System”, in A Linden ed., The Canadian Judiciary (Toronto:
Osgoode Hall Law School, 1976) at 111.
16

For example, see Barrett v. Layton (2003), 69 O.R. (3d) 384, 128 A.C.W.S. (3d) 920, [2003] O.J. No.
5572 (Ont. S.C.J.); A. (J.M.) v. Winnipeg Child & Family Services, 2004 MBCA 184, 247 D.L.R. (4 th) 490,
[2005] 4 W.W.R. 652 (Man. C.A.), leave to appeal refused (2005), 383 W.A.C. 319n, 208 Man. R.(2d)
319n, 345 N.R. 392n (S.C.C.).
17

Barrett v. Layton, ibid.

18

Ibid.
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assuming a “counsel-like” role, this approach to adjudication was upheld in a later
decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal.19
In a more recent decision in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 20 Justice
Kristjanson examined her responsibilities vis-à-vis a self-represented litigant who was
unknowingly seeking an order that would ultimately compromise his ability to pursue his
action. While acknowledging that the judge cannot become an advocate for a party, and
in so doing, “provide legal advice, advance new arguments for the self-represented
litigant or advise on strategy”, Justice Kristjanson recognized that she also had certain
conflicting responsibilities under the Canadian Judicial Council’s Statement of Principles
on Self-Represented Litigants and Accused Persons. Ultimately, she determined that
failing to advise the plaintiff of the potential consequences of the particular procedural
steps he was taking would effectively cause him to lose a significant right. As such, she
undertook to explain the relevant law and its implications and encouraged the plaintiff to
seek advice from a lawyer.21 In deciding to provide the plaintiff with crucial information
about his position, Kristjanson J. relied on the Judicial Council’s guiding principles
which contemplate judges explaining the relevant law and its implications to a selfrepresented litigant before the self-represented litigant makes “critical choices”.22
The efforts made by Kristjanson J. can be contrasted with another recent case
heard by the Ontario Court of Appeal. In Moore v. Apollo Health & Beauty Care,23 the
Court of Appeal held that a small claims court judge had failed to inquire about
seemingly conflicting statements that a self-represented litigant had made. While
acknowledging the challenges faced by busy trial court judges in trying to ease self-

19

Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) v. A. (J.), 2006 MBCA 44, 375 W.A.C. 50, 205 Man
R (2d) 50 (Man. C.A.).
20

Im v. BMO Investorline Inc., 2017 ONSC 95, 275 A.C.W.S. (3d) 510, 2017 CarswellOnt 48 (Ont. S.C.J.)
at paras. 4 and 5.
21

Coincidentally, Justice Kristjanson suggested the plaintiff attend at Pro Bono Law Ontario located on the
main floor of the courthouse in downtown Toronto; the same office where the interviews with selfrepresented litigants discussed later in this paper were conducted.
22

Canadian Judicial Council, “Statement of Principles on Self-Represented Litigants and Accused Persons”
(2006) at 7, available at www.cjcccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/news_pub_other_PrinciplesStatement_2006_en.pdf.
23

2017 ONCA 383, 278 A.C.W.S. (3d) 90, 2017 CarswellOnt 6742 (Ont. C.A.).

This is a pre-copy edited, post-peer reviewed version of the contribution accepted for publication in The
Advocates’ Quarterly. Reproduced by permission of Thomson Reuters Canada Limited.

6

represented litigants into an adversarial court process, Brown J.A. was also clear in
identifying the new reality (the growth of individuals representing themselves). He
suggested that the consequence of this “often requires a trial judge to take the time to ask
those few extra questions to nail down, with clarity for all, the claims of the selfrepresented person upon which he will adjudicate. Trial fairness requires no less.” 24
Accordingly, in order to ensure fairness in cases involving self-represented litigants, it is
worthwhile to consider some of the operating assumptions that underlie the adversarial
process and the adjudicator’s role within that process, as well as the self-represented
litigants’ direct experiences attempting to access justice.
The Role of the Judge in the Adversarial Process
These cases represent recent examples of judges engaging in a more active and
engaged role vis-à-vis self-represented litigants appearing before them. In many respects,
this approach runs contrary to traditional notions about judicial impartiality and
neutrality, notions that are closely associated with the administration of just proceedings
in an adversarial system. The adversarial system engages two main principles, namely,
that the parties have control over the initiation and termination of their claims, and that
they prosecute their claims as they see fit once commenced. In the context of the
adversarial process, methods that enhance the affected parties’ ability to participate in the
decision-making strengthen the overall exercise, while efforts to compromise the parties’
participation serve to impair the decision-making endeavour. 25

Legitimacy in the

decisions and the legal institutions generating the decisions is bolstered by the parties’
ability to engage and be heard in the process. Thus, the adversarial process incorporates
a procedural system “in which the parties not the judge have primary responsibility for
defining the issues in dispute and for carrying the dispute forward through the system.”26
Closely associated with these principles is the understanding that the particular processes
developed within an adversarial system are organized around the presentation and testing
of evidence by the respective parties as opposed to the judge. Underscoring this process

24

Ibid., at paras. 46 and 48.

25

Lon Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978), 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353 at 364.

26

Brooks, supra, footnote 15 at 93.
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is the belief that “accurate fact-finding is likely to result if the parties motivated by selfinterest are given the responsibilities of investigating facts and presenting arguments”. 27
As between different adjudicative processes, there are distinctions between the
scope of the judge’s role within the context of the collection and presentation of evidence
by the parties.28 Within the adversarial model, judges are thought to function as neutral
umpires who generally ensure that evenly matched legal representatives work within
certain parameters defined by procedural fairness.

This can be contrasted with an

inquisitorial legal system in which more judges actively manage legal processes by
conducting investigations, determining issues and controlling the presentation of
evidence.

By contrast, adversarial legal systems place all of these responsibilities

squarely on the parties’ shoulders.29 In an adversarial system, the assumption is that by
not taking an active role in the administration or presentation of the case adjudicators will
remain unbiased, unpartisan and, therefore, impartial in terms of their decision-making,
thereby fulfilling a commitment to procedural fairness. 30

One of the rationales

underlying this approach is that there is a risk of a psychological bias associated with the
decision-makers’ participation in the investigation and presentation of evidence.
Impartiality is considered to be a fundamental tenet of procedural fairness, and
thus, a cornerstone of the adversarial process. An impartial decision-maker is “one who
is able to make judgments with an open mind, that is, one who comes to the decisionmaking table without his or her ‘mind already made up’ or without connections that

27

Ibid. at 97.

28

Fuller, supra, footnote 25 at 356.

29

Russell G. Pearce, “Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never
Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help” (2004), 73:3 Fordham L. Rev. 969
at 972.
30

In the American context, Sande Buhai’s comments regarding the role of the judge in the adversarial
system have significant implications for self-represented litigants. She stated: “[p]erhaps because they are
trained primarily as lawyers and not as judges, American judges tend to view their role as that of a neutral
and impartial referee, consistent with the sporting theory of justice. They perceive their main job to be
procedural-to ensure that the adversary system, quintessentially a contest between lawyers, operates
efficiently and effectively.” See Sande L. Buhai, “Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants: A
Comparative Perspective” (2009), 42 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 979 at 994-95; Michelle Flaherty, “SelfRepresented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias: Issues in Administrative Law”
(2015) 38:1 Dal. L.J. 119 at 123.
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improperly influence the decision-making process”.31 Judicial impartiality is required for
arriving at a decision that is based on the evidence presented, and for a rigorous testing of
the evidence by opposing parties. Moreover, impartiality encourages confidence in the
decisions ultimately made by the adjudicator, and in so doing, further fosters the
legitimacy of the legal institutions in which the decisions are made. 32 The focus on
impartiality extends to the appearance of impartiality. In fact, the ethical code directing
judges’ conduct in Canada notes that judges “must be and seen to be free to decide
honestly and impartially on the basis of the law and evidence”. 33 Judges exhibit this
commitment to impartiality by adopting a passive stance. Consistent with a passive
stance, both adjudicators and the lawyers appearing before them often assume that the
principle of impartiality imposes a strict prohibition on adjudicators assisting a party. In
remarks made respecting judicial ethics, Lord Neuberger defined the judge’s passive role
in the following manner:
[i]t is not a judge’s function to conduct the trial or any part of it. And such a
course is fraught with dangers. An issue may have been avoided by both
sides for good substantive or tactical reasons of which the judge is unaware.
And if the judge appears to be batting for one party there is a real risk of
justice not being seen to be done – especially if that party eventually wins.34
This strict prohibition against assistance extends to those representing themselves
as well. This is notwithstanding that traditional notions of impartiality evolved in a time
when most litigants were represented by counsel, a fact that is no longer true in many
Canadian courts.

As such, the new reality of self-representation has brought two

31

Laverne Jacobs, “Caught Between Judicial Paradigms and the Administrative State’s Pastiche: ‘Tribunal’
Independence, Impartiality, and Bias” in Colleen M. Flood and Lorne Sossin, eds., Administrative Law in
Context, 2nd ed. (Toronto, Canada: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2013) 233 at 234.
32

Flaherty, supra, footnote 30 at 133-135.

33

Jona Goldschmidt & Loretta Stalans, “Lawyers’ Perceptions of the Fairness of Judicial Assistance to
Self-Represented Litigants” (2012), 30:1 Windsor YB Access Just. 139 at 152; Canadian Judicial Council,
The Ethical Principles for Judges (1998), available at www.cjcccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/news_pub_judicialconduct_principles_1998_en.pdf@statement/(purpose),
princ.3.
34

Lord Neuberger, “The Role of the Judge: Umpire in a Contest, Seeker of the Truth or Something in
Between” (August 19, 2016) Singapore Panel on Judicial Ethics and Dilemmas on the Bench: Opening
Remarks.
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competing duties of the judiciary into focus, namely impartiality and the duty to protect
individuals’ right to be heard.
The Problem with Passivity
Notwithstanding the importance of protecting impartial decision-making,
impartiality does not require passivity. 35 Moreover, a focus on the “appearance of
judicial neutrality” has resulted in improperly equating judicial engagement with judicial
non-neutrality.36 Empirical research regarding judicial impartiality has cast doubt on the
suggestion that judges are really unbiased and has instead suggested that what is really at
stake is only the appearance of impartiality. 37 An appearance should not “impair a
judge’s ability to intervene when he thinks it is necessary so long as the intervention is
fair and dispassionate”. 38 Consequently, a focus on the appearance of neutrality has
resulted in equating judicial engagement with non-neutrality and this, in turn, reinforces a
passive approach to judging that actually serves to undermine true neutrality.39
One of the problems with the assumption that passivity is commensurate with
neutrality and impartiality is that it is based on a concept of the adversarial system that, in
turn, makes other assumptions about the players within the system. It assumes that cases
involve a contest between lawyers who are equally well versed and well-resourced in the
requisite procedural and substantive law.

As such, the assumption is that lawyer-

represented parties are equally prepared for the legal contest. 40 Within the adversarial
context, it is assumed that the fairest decision is made when “two men argue, as unfairly
as possible, on opposite sides, for then it is certain that no important consideration will
altogether escape notice”.41 However, this justification is open to various critiques, one
35

Cynthia Gray, “Reaching out or Over-Reaching: Judicial Ethics and Self-Represented Litigants” (2007),
27:1 J. Nat’l. Assn. of Admin. Law Judiciary 97 at 105; Flaherty, supra, footnote 30.
36

Richard Zorza, “The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and Those of the
Appearance of Neutrality when Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and
Implications” (2004), 17 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 423.
37

Buhai, supra, footnote 30 at 982.

38

Brooks, supra, footnote 15 at 104.

39

Zorza, supra, footnote 36 at 440.

40

Flaherty, supra, footnote 30 at 124.

41

Brooks, supra, footnote 15 at 108 (quoting MaCaulay).
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of which is that a “contested theory of litigation” is inconsistent with obtaining the truth,
particularly where parties are exclusively focused on presenting evidence favourable to
their case and suppressing evidence that is unfavourable to their case. Moreover, in order
to work properly, it assumes that the parties are equally matched in their endeavor; this is
an assumption that is often idealistic at best.
These assumptions become even more problematic when one of the parties is
represented by a lawyer and the other party is not. In these instances, remaining passive
means judges fail to take account of the self-represented litigant’s lack of legal
knowledge and experience, both of which affect the individual’s ability to present her
case or respond to the opposing party’s case. Judge Posner’s self-represented inmate
provides a compelling example in this regard. In most legal contexts, self-represented
litigants are unable to participate because they are unfamiliar with the professional legal
language spoken by lawyers and judges and with the procedures that take place in and out
of the courtroom, not to mention the substantive legal issues raised in the case.42
The disparity in knowledge and experience between lawyers and self-represented
litigants calls the validity of a passive judicial attitude into question. The fact that the
legal process is only known to the represented party creates a distinctly unfair process
that actually serves to subvert impartial decision-making.43 The problem, as witnessed
firsthand by judges such as Posner and Kristjanson, is that, without a certain level of
judicial assistance and/or engagement, many self-represented litigants run the risk of
compromising positions and/or losing important legal rights because they are unable to
frame their dispute in traditional legal terms and/or unable to present the evidence as
expected by lawyer and judges. When judges remain passive, many self-represented
litigants are also left feeling like outsiders in the process. The lawyers and judges
operating within the civil justice system are very much insiders trained in the language
and process of law while the self-represented litigants remain unable to access that same
information and training. A consequence of this sense of exclusion is a reinforcement of
a belief that only certain voices are likely to be heard within the civil justice system. All
42

Macfarlane, “Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants”, supra, footnote 4 at 95.

43

Flaherty, supra, footnote 30 at 136-138.
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of this raises even more significant questions about the efficacy of a dispute process in
which large numbers of disputants do not understand the procedure, receive no assistance
when attempting to engage in the process and, as such, are left unable or unwilling to
express themselves.
Thus, in attempting to safeguard the administration of a fair and just adversarial
process in which parties can present their case to a neutral decision-maker, the adversarial
process actually functions in an unfair fashion: there is a distinct advantage to certain
parties (i.e., represented parties). In fact, there is an argument that from an ethical
standpoint, judicial passivity does not ensure neutrality in the case of self-represented
litigants but rather represents an “affirmatively harmful” approach. 44

The further

consequence is that many self-represented litigants cannot access the civil justice system
in a meaningful manner.
Self-Represented Litigants’ and the Judiciary
In appraising the continued workability and legitimacy of the adversarial process,
given the growth of self-representation, it is important to take account of the selfrepresented litigants’ perspective on their experiences engaging in the civil justice
system. 45 The following discussion canvasses the views and perspectives of selfrepresented litigants who were interviewed about their experiences representing
themselves in the civil justice system. 46

This was not meant to be a “customer

satisfaction survey”, but rather, was meant to encourage self-represented litigants to
reflect on their efforts to be heard in the litigation process. The theory is that this inquiry
would provide useful insights into the attitudinal issues as well as structural challenges
44

Carpenter, “Active Judging and Access to Justice”, supra note 5 at 16.

45

Trevor CW Farrow, Ab Currie, Nicole Aylwin et al., Everyday Legal Problems and the Costs of Justice
in Canada: Overview Report (Toronto: Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, 2016), online at www.cfcjfcjc.org/sites/default/files/Everyday%20Legal%20Problems%20and%20the%20Cost%20of%20Justice%20
in%20Canada%20-%20Overview%20Report.pdf.
46

The research project included interviews with self-represented litigants who sought assistance from a
self-help legal centre in downtown Toronto. The objective of the research project was to better understand
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that confront adjudicators and non-lawyers. A review of the narratives data collected
from these interviews reflects certain positive as well as negative aspects of the selfrepresented litigants’ experiences in court.

Together these experiences provide an

opportunity to further explore ways in which adjudicators might better interact with selfrepresented litigants.
For some of the self-represented litigants interviewed, their experience of appearing
before an adjudicator (whether it be a Master or a Judge) was positive in the sense that
they felt that they were provided with an opportunity to engage with the court, and
consequently, felt that they had been heard. For example, at the time of her interview,
one self-represented litigant had just lost a motion on the production of documents
requested at discovery. During the motion, she made submissions pertaining to the
relevancy of certain documents.

The Master hearing the motion ruled against her.

However, when reflecting on the hearing, she said, “it was fair. We lost very well”. In
referring to the Master, the self-represented litigant further suggested that the adjudicator
had been fair by guiding the questions.

When pushed to articulate what a “fair

adjudicator” looks like, the self-represented litigant suggested the Master was fair
because she believed he was an empathetic listener who did not rush her through her
submissions. Interestingly, the interviewee also suggested that moving her motion to the
end of the day (when the courtroom was less full) meant that she did not have an
‘audience’ while making her submissions – this also contributed to a less intimidating
experience.
In another example, a different interviewee described the adjudicator as “very nice
and when she wrote her short form [decision], she explained it to me so I’d understand
because I am not a lawyer, and she was wonderful”. 47 Again, the self-represented
litigant’s positive experience was based on the fact that the judge legitimized the
litigant’s right to be there by treating the individual with respect, while at the same time
explaining the steps such that the individual felt part of the process.
The positive perception of these self-represented litigants was often associated
with adjudicators who took time to explain court procedures, indicated that they had
47

Interview of EP dated December 15, 2014 at 4.

This is a pre-copy edited, post-peer reviewed version of the contribution accepted for publication in The
Advocates’ Quarterly. Reproduced by permission of Thomson Reuters Canada Limited.

13

reviewed the self-represented litigants’ materials and made efforts to understand the selfrepresented litigants’ submissions by asking questions and seeking clarifications.
Interestingly, in referring to the decisions rendered by the adjudicators, the selfrepresented litigants often further acknowledged that, while sympathetic to their position,
the adjudicator’s “hands were tied.” Notwithstanding that the adjudicator was ruling
against them, there was a link between the self-represented litigant’s perceptions about
their ability to participate in the process and the way in which the decision was presented
to them. In some instances, individuals’ perceptions about the fairness of a hearing were
based, in part, on whether the adjudicator was seen to take account of the self-represented
litigant’s submissions in reaching a decision. This did not mean that the adjudicator
necessarily agreed with the self-represented litigant’s submissions. It was rather that the
individual’s position had been considered and the adjudicator in presenting her judgment
explained the reasoning and the outcome. In this regard, one self-represented litigant
noted,
Judge *** heard me, because he wrote a six-part endorsement. And he
stepped up to the plate and read aloud my statements in court…[Interviewer:
How did you feel about that when he did that?]…I thought it was awesome
that he would be so openly supportive. He clearly saw there was a concern.
But again his hands were tied. There’s a lawsuit on the table but he very,
very carefully worded that endorsement.48
Unfortunately, not all of the self-represented litigants had positive experiences in
court. Canvassing some of the self-represented litigants’ negative experiences also
highlights some of the tension between the expectations and assumptions held by selfrepresented litigants about what the judge’s role should be. While it is important not to
overstate the significance of one negative court experience on an individual’s overall
perceptions about the fairness of the legal process, it is also important to remember the
significant role that judges continue to play in society. To many individuals, the judge
has “a significant reservoir of respect and credibility, they have near total authority in the
courtrooms, and they face a public with a desperate desire to feel that they will be
listened to when they go to court.”49 In many respects, for the self-represented litigant,
48
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the judge becomes the embodiment of a fair legal system: it is the individual who ensures
that ‘justice is done’.50 In fact, many self-represented litigants often feel that if they can
just get in front of a judge (and have the judge listen to their story) then they could get
“justice”. 51 As such, when self-represented litigants are compelled to engage with
adjudicators directly, it is not surprising that the role played by the judge becomes
extremely significant to the non-lawyer’s conceptualization of access and justice more
broadly.
From an attitudinal perspective, certain self-represented litigants interviewed
described discomfiting interactions with adjudicators that often left them feeling
embarrassed and ineffectual in representing themselves. Historical perceptions about
self-represented litigants as vexatious litigants may influence attitudes and assumptions
about non-lawyers appearing in court. However, it is again important to take account of
the changing demographics respecting self-representation and its prevalence in a myriad
of different legal contexts.52 As legal representation is essentially priced out of the reach
of a majority of individuals, it can be assumed that large numbers of individuals with
legitimate legal disputes will be obligated to represent themselves. Moreover, while selfrepresented litigants may be unsuccessful in their cases, that fact alone should not
diminish the legitimacy of their claims.
One of the sources of self-represented litigants’ anxiety respecting these encounters
was that, as non-lawyers, they are unfamiliar with courtroom rules and procedures. Yet,
in many instances, they are expected to act in a fashion similar to legal professionals who
attend regularly in these courts. In some instance, they were advised by the court that
they would not be afforded any special consideration because of the fact they were selfrepresented. In one specific example, a self-represented litigant recounted an incident in
50
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which the judge explicitly told him, “we will make no exceptions for you because you
are a self-represented litigant”.53 Such a blunt articulation of the court’s attitude toward
the presence of self-represented litigants underscores the apprehension that many selfrepresented litigants feel when representing themselves. As a result, they worry about
making mistakes, embarrassing themselves or missing opportunities to present their case.
In one such example, the individual raised an issue with the court that had been
overlooked and, as a result, was subject to a reprimand by the judge. In re-telling her
account of the appearance, she expressed embarrassment at being yelled at by a judge in
front of a courtroom of lawyers and clients. While judicial expressions of dissatisfaction
with a particular party’s conduct may be justified, and thus not overly problematic, it is
important to be cognizant of the inherent differences between how a self-represented
litigant and a lawyer interpret the court’s reproach.
Another self-represented litigant recounted two very different court appearances
related to a real estate case. In reflecting on these appearances, he highlighted some of the
particular challenges he thought he faced as a self-represented individual in court –
namely, as an “outsider” to the process both physically and in terms of experience and
knowledge. Without any guidance from the court, a self-represented litigant can often
lose an opportunity to engage due to unfamiliarity with the proper procedure and a
corresponding fear about speaking out of turn (and consequently being reprimanded) or
being wrong.54 In this regard, he said,
…as a self-rep it’s kind of you’re really on the hot seat. Aside from that,
again the procedural things, knowing when to speak, what to call who,
how to refer to what, what to be careful of, what sort of rights you have,
when you should speak, when you shouldn’t speak. I guess another point
that was kind of an issue was just in terms of the vestments. The attorney
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of course has their robes as does the justice...We’re the only one not
wearing a robe.55
This particular self-represented litigant’s views of court proceedings were also
significantly impacted in another respect. In describing the judge’s approach, the selfrepresented litigant felt that the adjudicator showed little interest in hearing from him,
because she said that she did not want to hear from him without any explanation as to the
basis for so doing.
One of the risks associated with these perceptions is that the adjudicator is not
interested in the individual’s position or arguments and/or has pre-judged the particular
matter. While lawyers may understand that such a comment is not necessarily negative
(i.e., the lawyer’s position does not raise significant issues or questions for the judge),
self-represented litigants are likely to have the opposite understanding -- that the
adjudicator does not wish to hear from the individual because she does not see the
individual’s position as valid or legitimate. Moreover, judges, accustomed to having a
particularized conversation with the lawyers who appear before them, are not in a
position to engage with non-lawyers who do not speak the traditional legal vernacular.
The use of technical legal terms and even Latin terms – one adjudicator repeatedly
referring to nunc pro tunc in the course of a motion involving a self-represented litigant –
serve to isolate the non-lawyers and effectively preclude them from participating in the
conversation.
A further consideration is that individuals who go to court to defend themselves are
judged by individuals who they believe are disconnected from the realities of the
litigants’ lives; remembering again that the majority of self-represented litigants are in
court because they cannot afford legal representation. This view was echoed by another
individual who worried that the socio-economic and educational gap between judges and
many self-represented litigants (as opposed to lawyers), made it difficult for judges to
engage with self-represented litigants. This further reflects a perception about “insiders”
and “outsiders” within the legal system.
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The frustration exhibited by the self-represented litigants regarding their
experiences with judges also resonated with volunteer lawyers who assist the selfrepresented litigants at the legal self-help centre. In discussing the importance to selfrepresented litigants of being “heard” by the adjudicator, one volunteer lawyer stated,
[s]o I understand that it’s frustrating to hear the guy mutter and move his
papers and talk about irrelevant stuff. But I think the value of moving it to
the bottom of the list, saying ‘okay listen I’m going to hear you out’…You
have an hour, you booked an hour, you tell me everything you want to tell
me for the next hour and I’m going to write my notes. I don't know why
there isn’t a little more empathy.56
This view is consistent with some of the research that has studied individuals’
perceptions about procedural fairness. The research links the idea of “being heard” with
perceptions about the fairness of legal processes. 57 More specifically, being heard
influences whether individuals believe that they can meaningfully engage in the legal
processes that affect them. These findings resonate with the self-represented litigants in
the sense that the ability not only to present their case, but also to receive an indication
from the adjudicator that their story was heard (often measured by the provision of
reasons for the decision reached) significantly affected their sense of fairness. This is
consistent with a political and psychological view that focuses on the importance of
individuals’ meaningful participation in the decisions being made about them.58 In the
specific context of self-representation, meaningful participation most often will require
judicial intervention in order to ensure that individuals are able to present their case and
the judge clearly understands the case being presented by non-lawyers.59 The difficult
question becomes how the role of the adjudicator might be better imagined in an era of
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self-representation so as to ensure that self-represented litigants are heard and able to
participate in their hearings.
In the examples discussed, the self-represented litigants who felt that they were
listened to and taken seriously by the adjudicator generally had positive experiences in
court. These positive experiences were, in several instances, unconnected to the ultimate
outcome that they achieved in the hearing. In fact, in suggesting that the adjudicator’s
‘hands were tied,’ it would appear that the self-represented litigants were often prepared
to accept an unfavourable decision when they felt that the adjudicators took the time to
listen to their position, explained the process, and articulated, in plain terms, the basis of
their decision. Moreover, in acknowledging receipt and review of the self-represented
litigants’ written materials and/or oral submissions, the adjudicator was perceived to have
legitimized the self-represented litigant’s efforts to engage in

the process,

notwithstanding the legal validity of the claims made. In this sense, the self-represented
litigant was not treated as an “outsider” or a nuisance, but rather, as an active participant
in the process.
By contrast, a negative experience with a judge had the effect of compounding the
self-represented litigant’s perception of being an “outsider”. The formal procedures
followed in court, the informal practices known to counsel, the language used by lawyers
and judges, and even the robes worn by the lawyers and judges all serve to highlight the
perceived gulf between “insiders” (judges and lawyers) and “outsiders” (self-represented
litigants). The perceptions of this gulf are further complicated by the view that lawyers
and judges remain part of the same elite profession and, as such, inhabit a similar socioeconomic sphere of which many self-represented litigants are not part.60 Together this
division between insiders and outsiders contributes to perceptions about social exclusion
and the distinction between those individuals who may physically be able to gain entry to
various legal institutions, but are otherwise are unable to meaningfully participate in the
decision-making processes that affect them. Individuals who are socially excluded suffer
from economic disadvantage and are less likely to secure and/or be in a position to
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protect rights that include employment, housing, health care and education.61 This lack
of access to justice perpetuates disengagement and potentially marginalization: “a lack of
access to justice results not just from factors tied to the subjective perceptions of those
who are excluded. It also flows from social marginalization visited upon them by the
societal mainstream.”62 In this sense, self-represented litigants may be marginalized in a
system that is not designed to include their direct engagement and remains resistant to
their participation.
In many respects, the attitudes and approaches adopted by adjudicators toward
self-represented litigants may serve to widen this perceived gap rather than close it. In
some examples, the adjudicators did not appear to take account of what the individual
was saying, spoke to opposing counsel in legal terms not understood by the non-lawyer
and/or scolded the non-lawyer for speaking out of turn or making a procedural mistake.
When combined with a failure to actively engage with the self-represented litigant, this
stance serves to exacerbate certain perceptions about the non-lawyer’s ability to engage
as well as the fairness of the decision-making process.
A Paradigm Shift and A New Role for Adjudicators
These narratives are not meant to suggest that all judges act in one fashion nor
that all self-represented litigants act in a similar fashion. However, the individuals’
experiences do highlight the need to examine how we better reconcile the roles played by
members of the judiciary with the new reality within the civil justice system. The
response cannot simply assume that simplified court forms and more legal information
will be sufficient.

In fact, the provision of simplified forms and additional legal

information without systemic reform to the legal process creates a tension by which the
non-lawyer’s expectations about her abilities to participate do not match her experience
engaging with the legal process in court. Rather, the challenge is much more significant
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and involves reappraising the assumptions that are made about the roles judges play
within an adversarial system and how continued reliance on those assumptions provides
an increasingly dysfunctional model of civil litigation as it pertains to the reality of selfrepresentation. In this sense, the question can no longer be whether judges should assist
self-represented litigants, but rather how judges might best assist self-represented
litigants.
Contributing to this challenge is the need to remain mindful of certain of the
process values that underscore an adjudicative system. These include the acceptability
and legitimacy of the process by those who use it and the accuracy of the fact-finding
processes developed within it.63 The procedures that are developed in accordance with
these process values also need to inform the responses to current challenges within the
system. For instance, finality of disputes, dignity of the participants and impartiality are
all important attributes of a procedural system that need to be accounted for in any
changes to the legal process.
My focus will be on the values associated with judicial impartiality. As noted,
operationalizing impartiality assumes judges will act as neutral umpires that facilitate the
presentation of evidence by evenly matched legal professionals.64 Given the complexity
and professionalization of many legal procedures, not to mention the relevant substantive
law, the preparation and presentation of a case typically necessitates expert legal advice
and specialized information. In this sense, the parties, through their lawyers, maneuver
through a complex legal process. However:
[w]here the law, the rules of procedure, and the legal processes are
unintelligible or unfamiliar to one or more of the litigants, cases stop being a
dialogue between informed and experienced participants within a
framework designed to test evidence and facilitate truth seeking. Instead,
cases turn into a frustrating exercise in imposing legal norms on parties who
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do not grasp their significance, and who see them as arbitrary, unfair, or
simply unintelligible.65
Despite this complexity and lawyer-control of the process, it is assumed that the judge
remains a “neutral and impartial referee”. 66 However, “passivity and silence” from
judges in situations where the lawyers are not equal in terms of the task of presenting
their client’s respective cases distorts the “whole process of the administration of
justice”. 67 The process fails to work properly if one of the underlying assumptions
respecting the equal abilities of the parties is mistaken. Thus, rather than serving the
adversary process by maintaining a neutral stance toward the parties, judicial passivity
undermines that same process by failing to address flawed presentations and ensure that
the parties are provided with an equal opportunity to present their best case.
Taken a step further, the particular realities associated with the growth of selfrepresentation render traditional assumptions about judges and passive adjudication
fundamentally untenable.68 Without active intervention from an adjudicator, there is a
risk of an inherent disadvantage to those who attempt to participate in legal processes, but
are unfamiliar with the rules and procedures, particularly as they relate to the preparation
and presentation of evidence. In particular, opportunities to present certain facts and
respond to the facts presented by an opposing party are crucial aspects of the adversarial
process.

The procedures involving the presentation of evidence remain highly

professionalized and, therefore, weighted in favour of legal professionals and their
clients. Notwithstanding this, the objective must be to ensure that self-represented
litigants are able to engage in the civil justice system on a level that is relatively
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commensurate with lawyers. In order to fulfill this objective, it is necessary that the
judiciary engage with the self-represented litigants that appear before them.69
In conceptualizing a shift in roles, it is important to explore some different
approaches to reform that have been offered.

Historically, self-representation was

responded to with calls for more legal services, whether this meant traditional
representation by counsel or modified services such as unbundled legal services. In
essence, this is described as supply-side reform. 70 However, given the limitations
associated with supply-side reform (including the financial costs associated with
providing more legal representation as well as the sheer magnitude of selfrepresentation), the provision of more lawyers and/or unbundled services is not likely to
eliminate the growth of self-representation. As such, there have been more recent calls
for the development of demand-side reform. Demand-size reform:
refers to the overhaul of the processes and rules that govern litigation so that
they best serve the interests of the overwhelming majority of customers…the
unrepresented. Effective demand side reform would review the procedural
and evidentiary rules that commonly cause pro se litigants to stumble and
require judges to develop facts that support established claims and defences,
thus enabling meaningful participation in the court system by those who
appear without counsel. Fundamental changes to the way disputes are
processed and decided in the poor people’s courts are needed to bring the
operation of the legal system into alignment with the capabilities of the
litigants who use it.71
The adversarial process as it currently operates has essentially been designed
by and for lawyers. As such, it remains ill equipped to encourage or facilitate nonlawyer involvement. Consistent with demand-side reform is the need for a reconstituting of the judge’s role within a reformed process. Specifically, changes to
the procedural and evidentiary rules must be implemented by judges who take
seriously their engagement with self-represented litigants as legitimate and
deserving participants in the legal process.
69
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Lessons from the Administrative Law Context
Notwithstanding that there has been much debate about the extent to which
administrative tribunals should adopt the procedural processes of the common law court
systems, 72 administrative law has operated on different assumptions. While the civil
justice system has traditionally operated on the assumption that parties require lawyers to
maneuver successfully through the system, the same is not always assumed about the
administrative law context, particularly in certain tribunal settings.73 In these settings, it
is generally assumed that adjudicators may be active in assisting non-lawyers and, at the
same time, remain impartial decision-makers.74 Given that many administrative tribunals
contemplate individuals appearing without counsel and have undertaken to develop
processes that take account of that fact, perhaps it is time to reverse the thinking process
and examine the operationalization of tribunals in terms of civil justice reform.75 Like
adjudicators presiding over tribunal hearings, it may be time for judges to adopt a more
active role at trial when hearing cases involving self-represented litigants. Thus, drawing
on an idea (i.e., “substantive impartiality”) that has developed within the administrative
law context, differently situated parties might be treated differently so that an adjudicator
is able to ensure that the legal system is fair and navigable to all parties. 76 The key
consideration is that the process is fair to all parties commensurate with their ability to
participate. In this regard, the “test” is what enhanced engagement ensures that any
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litigant, regardless of whether he or she has a lawyer, is able to present his or her case to
an impartial adjudicator?77
Questions about the nature of the adjudicator’s role within administrative tribunal
hearings have often been examined within the context of the dichotomy between the
adversarial-inquisitorial models of judicial procedure.78 This paper does not advocate a
complete shift from an adversarial model to an inquisitorial model of dispute resolution.
However, the issue of self-representation does raise serious and foundational questions
about the need for a spectrum of judicial engagement that ensures that the adversary
process operates in a fair and equitable fashion for all litigants. Thus, rather than framing
the issues as a debate between adversarial and inquisitorial models of dispute resolution,
a better way to approach questions about the role of the adjudicator would be to examine
the “degree of intervention – ranging from a passive, reactive stance to a more proactive
or intrusive one” – that attempts to reassure represented and unrepresented parties that
their cases are heard on the merits.79 In other words, different judicial contexts would
require different levels of engagement by the adjudicator.

This may range from

informational assistance about the steps in a hearing through to active adjudication
whereby the judge shapes the process and provides direction to the parties.
In the administrative context, active adjudication has been characterized as a
“midway point” between the adversarial and inquisitorial models.

It involves

adjudicators not only providing information, but also shaping how the process unfolds.
This includes efforts by the adjudicator to articulate the legal issues to be resolved (with
input from the parties), explain the procedures to be followed (including an ordering of
factual issues and the corresponding evidence to be presented), engagement with the
parties respecting the evidence actually presented, and explanations of the decision
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rendered.80 In the broadest of strokes and taking account of impermissible behaviour that
would give rise to an apprehension of bias, there would be a flexible range of judicial
direction and assistance necessary to ensure a level playing field for all of the parties.81
It is acknowledged that increased judicial assistance is not without challenges.
One is that there will be a perceived apprehension of bias on behalf of the represented
parties82 and/or an over-reliance by self-represented parties on the adjudicator hearing
their case: effectively turning judges into advocates.

The test respecting bias (and

judicial disqualification) focuses on whether the reasonable person would view the
judge’s conduct as biased. The focus is on the apprehension or appearance of bias.83 As
a consequence, passivity has historically been viewed as a means of countering an
appearance of bias. Passivity is associated with decision-making that does not contain a
particular inclination or predisposition. In the context of passivity, the argument is that,
“judicial impartiality and the parties” control of the process are two sides of the same
coin”. 84 Moreover, remaining detached from the fact-finding process is thought to
counteract concerns about decision-makers’ bias whereby a decision-maker investigates
and thereby controls the facts upon which the same decision-maker will rely when
rendering a judgment.85 The criticisms leveled at adversarial judges who actively engage
in the presentation of the cases before them is that such actions are likely to suggest that
the judge has failed to remain an equal distance from both parties, is no longer neutral,
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and has instead demonstrated a bias toward one of the parties.86 These criticisms were
leveled at Judge Posner when he took steps to inform himself of certain medical facts that
significantly impacted the persuasiveness of the responding party’s case.

However,

allegations of bias stemming from judicial engagement could be addressed (and hopefully
minimized) by judges at the outset of the proceeding, wherein the judge sets out the
nature and scope of her assistance and possibly allows the parties to engage in a
discussion about her engagement.
A move away from a strict adherence to neutrality through passive adjudication
toward a more flexible and active approach to judging provides an opportunity to better
address self-represented litigants’ needs.87 Underscoring this shift is the recognition that
judicial assistance does not signal the presence of a bias. Rather, there is a need to
refocus neutrality such that it ensures fairness within the proceeding. This link between
neutrality and fairness has been examined within the meditation context. Not dissimilar
to the adversarial context, there is a tension between ensuring that the mediator is neutral
regarding the parties’ positions and objectives and ensuring that the parties can negotiate
fair agreements.88
Interestingly, traditional notions about the neutrality of the mediator have been
influenced by the role of the adjudicator in the adversarial context. Moreover, similar to
the party control exercised within the adversarial process, the mediation process also
stresses party control over the process and, not insignificantly, control over the
outcome. 89 Thus, by remaining neutral, the mediator allows the parties to shape the
resolution of the dispute. However, there is a critique that these traditional notions of
neutrality in meditation are insufficient in addressing questions of power, justice and
ideology that underscore and legitimize certain dialogue in meditation and alienate other
86
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discourse.90 As a consequence, there is a call for mediators to engage in the dialogue
rather than remain silent. This is done by “shaping problems in ways that provide all
speakers not only an opportunity to tell their story but a discursive opportunity to tell a
story that does not contribute to their own de-legitimization or marginalization”.91 In so
doing, mediators potentially engage in a more active and enabling role that ensures that
all of the parties are able to participate and be heard, thereby ensuring fairness both in
terms of process and outcome.
In terms of passivity, the practical reality is also that many adjudicators no longer
operate within a purely adversarial process.

Instead, adjudicators operate within a

modified adversarial system that requires judicial engagement at various stages of the
legal process including pre-trial and case conferences, settlement conferences, and
judicial approval of certain resolutions. 92 Important data recently collected by the
Canadian Forum on Civil Justice indicates that various courts and tribunals across
Canada offer a variety “front-end, early resolution resources onsite” that include pre-trial
conferences, informal resolution and case management, triage services, conciliation
services, summary advice, pro bono services and mini trials. All of these services reflect
a shift away from a traditional adversarial process and a move toward a “multi-door,
multi-service model”. 93 Generally speaking, the growth of procedures such as case
management has created a more active judiciary whose members perform certain
managerial roles within the litigation process; these roles were traditionally controlled by
the parties through their lawyers. 94 Arguably, the growth of these various procedural
reforms reflect ongoing efforts to ensure fair hearings. In the American context, the
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United States Supreme Court decision of Turner v. Rogers 95 called for the use of
“alternative procedure safeguards” in cases involving self-represented litigants. 96 The
basis for such a call was grounded in the protection of an individual’s right to due process
and in a recognition that non-lawyers face unique challenges when attempting to be heard
in the legal system.97
In light of very serious concerns about the ability of self-represented litigants to
participate, and the corresponding call for judges to take a more active role in cases
involving non-lawyers,98 the question that arises is what would less traditional judicial
approaches look like? 99

In particular, what approaches would assist litigants in

developing their factual record, and engage in the litigation process notwithstanding a
lack of legal training?100
It is suggested that there are different ways through which to reform the
procedural framework and the judicial role within it when dealing with self-represented
litigants. One approach relies on informality both in terms of the scope of procedural
rules governing the legal process and their application by judges. The belief is that, in the
context of self-representation, judges should be granted broad discretion in deciding how
best to manage trials in their courtrooms.101 However, this raises a concern that with a
broad discretion comes broad discrepancies in the ways in which different judges alter (or
decline to alter) the procedures to address self-represented litigants’ needs.
An alternative approach suggests that, consistent with a new judicial role, there
should be a new procedural regime that is designed to accommodate self-represented
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litigants. Such a system would, “turn the current system of party-driven adjudication on
its head, from the inception of a complaint through the enforcement of a judgment”.102
One of the focuses of a new procedural regime would be with respect to the rules
surrounding the presentation and evaluation of evidence.

Effectively, subject to

privilege, all evidence would be admitted, but judges would have a duty to evaluate the
evidence in terms of weight rather than admissibility. A procedural regime has the benefit
of providing sufficient guidance to all those participating in the legal process, including
lawyers, self-represented litigants and judges. Furthermore, it also alleviates the
responsibility of self-represented litigants to admit their evidence and challenge the
opposing party’s evidence. This would rest with the judge. However, developing a new
legal framework of this breadth is a significant and timely endeavor and one that is likely
to meet a good deal of resistance. At a minimum, there needs to be debate from and
among those who are currently versed in the procedures and operate accordingly.
From a practical standpoint, and given the sizeable number of self-represented
litigants continuing to enter the civil justice system, there is a need to incorporate
immediate and necessary steps that ensure that self-represented litigants understand the
process so that they are able to move their case through the various procedural steps and
substantive issues.103 Moreover, there is an urgent need to ensure, attitudinally, that the
self-represented litigant is no longer viewed as a nuisance that effectively slows down the
litigation process.
In terms of some of these immediate steps, the self-represented litigants
interviewed had very definite views on when they felt they were heard and, by contrast,
what left them feeling excluded from the process. These views provide a useful basis of
discussion about how to approach more immediate judicial engagement.

For self-

represented litigants who had positive experiences presenting their cases to adjudicators,
there were certain similar characteristics shared by the participants. First of all, on a very
practical level, the self-represented litigants felt that the adjudicators took account of
them in the courtroom. For example, the judge might move the self-represented litigant’s
102
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matter to the bottom of the list of matters to be heard that day. At first glance, this might
appear to be unfair to the self-represented litigant. However, it was noted that, by
moving the matter to the end of the day, it was likely that the courtroom would be less
full and, thus, less intimidating. Secondly, in these instances, the adjudicator took time to
explain the process to the self-represented litigant; this included how the hearing would
unfold, who would speak first, when there would be an opportunity to respond, etc. This
initiative had the dual effect of easing the self-represented litigant’s anxiety over legal
formalities and providing her with a roadmap for the process.

This is particularly

important considering that many steps may not always be outlined in the Rules of
Procedure.

Alternatively, the rules as articulated may be applied differently in the

courtroom.
Relevant to this type of judicial engagement is a need for transparency in the
process pursuant to which the judge outlines an approach that is both active and neutral.
In this context, transparency means that the audience actually sees what is going on in the
institution, that the institution is trying to be open, and has adopted means of operating
that attempts to guarantee that the parties actually understand what the judge is doing and
why.104 Important to this concept of transparency is the need for continued explanation
of a novel process, of the rationale for a novel process, and of the decision ultimately
reached. By doing so, the participants might better understand why an adjudicator may
approach the process in a particular way, which may help to alleviate concerns about
bias.
In the case of those self-represented litigants interviewed, in addition to taking
time to explain the process, the adjudicators also took steps to engage the self-represented
litigants in their submissions. For example, adjudicators demonstrated their engagement
by asking questions, allowing time to respond, and signaling that they had read the selfrepresented litigants’ materials and made efforts to understand their position. This is
notwithstanding the fact that the self-represented litigants’ materials often did not
conform to traditional legal drafting expectations. At the conclusion of the proceeding,
the commitment to explain the process to the self-represented litigant also extended to the
104
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delivery of a written endorsement or a judgment with reasons provided in plain
language.105
The fairness and effectiveness of adjudication are promoted by “reasoned
opinions”.106 Without such opinions, the parties have to take it on good faith that their
participation in the decision was real and the adjudicator has, in fact, understood and
taken account of their proofs and arguments. Not only are reasoned opinions an integral
part of the adjudicative process, but so too is the communication of the reasoned
judgment in a clear manner. Such communication signals that the judge “heard” the
individual and took account of her position and story in making the decision. More
practically, in cases involving self-represented litigants, communication of the judgment
helps to ensure that the individual understood the consequences and implications
associated with the decision.
There are also more fundamental challenges involving the presentation of selfrepresented litigants’ cases that could be better addressed by judicial engagement. For
example, the preparation and delivery of opening statements can be quite challenging for
self-represented litigants who find it difficult to distinguish between appropriate opening
statements and evidentiary statements. 107 One adjudicator in a tribunal setting has
suggested dispensing with opening statements in cases involving self-represented
litigants. Instead, at the commencement of the hearing, the adjudicator should set out the
legal and factual issues to be decided in the case with the parties’ participation. 108
Another particular challenge for non-lawyers involves the application of certain rules of
evidence; these can be virtually incomprehensible to many self-represented litigants. In
105
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dealing with the presentation of and response to opposing parties’ evidence, judges may
need to control more directly how a party presents its evidence through explanations, the
posing of questions and the parceling out of evidence on different issues. One interesting
suggestion made in the context of reforms addressing the presentation of evidence is the
creation of a “pre-trial examination (if necessary, by a judicial officer other than the
ultimate adjudicator) of the nature and extent of evidence to be presented”.109 Such a pretrial examination could vet the evidence the parties are proposing to present and, in so
doing, provide specific direction regarding the scope, form and limits of the evidence
needed. This could be of great benefit to self-represented litigants both in terms of
understanding what is required of them and what to expect and prepare in respect of the
opposing parties.
While many of these steps do not fundamentally change the judges’ role in the
sense that they must remain impartial as to the probative value of the evidence provided,
the modified process does require judges to adopt a more active role in relation to the
presentation of evidence.

These two aspects of the adversarial procedure highlight

examples of the need to re-examine the litigation process from the perspective of the selfrepresented litigants. Other aspects of the process such as preparation and presentation of
pleadings (and by extension, summary judgment motions), oversight of the discovery
process and cross-examination process are further examples that require re-examination
in light of the rise of self-representation. In particular, the discovery process raises
unique challenges as it occurs outside of the court setting, and in many respects, requires
that those participating in the process self-regulate their behaviour. In this sense, it
represents a particular challenge for self-represented litigants. This is because while legal
counsel can rely on the fact that disruptive opposing counsel might be subject to judicial
scrutiny through various interlocutory proceedings, self-represented litigants are not
likely to pursue the same course of action when an opposing party is abusing the
discovery process.
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While many of these examples of judicial assistance appear modest in effort, the
effect on the self-represented litigants’ perceptions of their ability to participate and be
heard can be significant.

In many of the positive incidents recounted by the self-

represented litigants interviewed, the individuals were either unsuccessful or only
partially successful in persuading the court of their position. Notwithstanding their lack
of success, their assessment of the fairness of the proceeding was more encouraging.
Thus, while it may be frustrating from the judge’s perspective to hear submissions from a
non-lawyer who appears unfamiliar with the process and very likely is uncomfortable
speaking, there is an important benefit to be gained by judges rejecting traditional notions
of judicial passivity and formality. They might say to self-represented litigants, “[y]ou
have an hour. You booked an hour, you tell me everything you want to tell me for the
next hour and I am going to write my notes”.110
The lessons learned from the self-represented litigants’ narratives, other empirical
research111 and the emerging case law such as those discussed in this paper suggest that
there is a spectrum of practical steps and strategies that need to be introduced to better
address the presence and needs of self-represented litigants. In addressing concerns
about the implications of these initiatives for the adversarial process and the judiciary’s
impartiality within that process, it is important to take account of the flexibility possessed
by adjudicators within their own courtrooms. While guided by principles of procedural
fairness and impartiality, adjudicators are otherwise afforded a certain degree of
discretion in adopting a liberal interpretation of pleadings and civil procedure rules and in
directing the course of a trial. In the appellate decision of Limoges v. Investors Group
Financial Services Inc., for example, the Manitoba Court of Appeal noted that measures
such as advising a self-represented litigant to recast her cause of action, adjourning the
trial so that the self-represented litigant could call a witness, and allowing a party to call a
witness out of order may be appropriate as “strict compliance with the rules of evidence
and procedure is not always necessary or efficacious particularly when one or both of the
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parties is self-represented”. 112 As such, it is incumbent on the adjudicator that she
exercise her discretion in a manner that ensures that all parties, whether represented or
not, are able to present their case.
Reflective of this shift in paradigm, the Canadian Judicial Council has taken
positive steps toward a judicial approach that contemplates “engaged neutrality” when
faced with self-represented litigants. The Supreme Court of Canada recently endorsed
this approach in the case of Pintea.113 The Judicial Council’s statement of principles on
self-represented litigants highlights the important role that judges must play in ensuring
that self-represented litigants are provided with an opportunity to be heard. Specifically,
the Judicial Council states that “[j]udges, the courts and other participants in the justice
system have a responsibility to promote opportunities for all persons to understand and
meaningfully present their case, regardless of representation”. 114 Justice Kristjanson’s
decision to assist the self-represented litigant in her courtroom reflects the need to reform
the approach that the judiciary takes in presiding over cases involving self-represented
litigants. The Judicial Council suggests judges may, when hearing cases involving selfrepresented litigants, take added steps to explain the process, provide information about
the law and evidentiary requirements, modify the order in which evidence is presented,
and question witnesses. All of these steps contemplate a shift away from a traditionally
passive judge towards a new actively engaged judge. However, it is worth noting that the
principles outlined by the Judicial Council have been in place since 2006. As such, while
it is important to outline broad principles that set a tone of accommodation, there is also a
more immediate need to develop more concrete guidance that clearly delineates new roles
for judges in cases involving self-representation.115 Delineation of concrete guidelines
would be consistent with a shift in thinking that no longer considers whether judges
should intervene in cases involving self-representation, but rather, how best to intervene
to ensure a fair and meaningful legal process.
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There is also an argument that, to the extent that members of the judiciary engage
with self-represented litigants, it will have a “trickle-down” effect on lawyers who appear
before those judges. In this regard, judges have a crucial role to play in ensuring that
self-represented litigants are heard within the courtroom, but also in terms of how other
participants within the system (lawyers and court workers) act toward self-represented
litigants. As judges begin to address self-represented litigants in different ways, there is
likely to be a corresponding expectation on behalf of those judges that opposing lawyers
will also begin to engage in a different fashion. This effect has particular ramifications
for the processes that occur outside of the courtroom, such as cross-examinations and
examinations for discovery. The American canons respecting judicial conduct require
that judges “exercise their authority in the courtroom to prevent attorneys from bullying
or misleading conduct meant to take advantage of a self-represented litigant”.116
Related to some of the fundamental questions about a more engaged role for
adjudicators are operational concerns that a more active form of adjudication will cause
additional delay and strain on an already over-burdened civil justice system. However,
concerns about delay and additional costs cannot be what exclusively drive the
functioning of courts. Furthermore, while concerns about increased costs and delay are
relevant from a policy perspective, it is also important that serious account be taken of
those attempting to access the legal system and the negative consequences associated
with failing to provide meaningful access.117 Specifically, concerns about over-burdened
courts, timely resolution of disputes and increased efficiency must be weighed against the
needs and rights of individuals who are obligated to come before a legal system without
legal representation.118 Moreover, consideration must be given to the harms associated
with a continued disengagement by large segments of the population. The principal
harms involve the de-legitimization of the legal process and the decisions made within it
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and the potential exit of individuals from the justice system. 119

In this sense,

strengthening a self-represented litigant’s ability to be heard requires continued direct
engagement with the members of the public attempting to be heard in the legal system.120
Conclusion
As I have sought to demonstrate, the signs of impending crisis within the civil
litigation process are plain to see.

Indeed, the existence of large numbers of self-

represented litigants does not simply create difficult challenges within the legal process,
but presents a huge and subversive challenge to the legal process itself and the role of the
judiciary within it.

As such, there is a pressing need to re-evaluate the existing

adversarial model and to re-construe the judges’ role within it. How the legal system
responds to these fundamental challenges will be a good indication of whether there is a
genuine desire to make substantive and substantial changes that best promote and
advance access to justice. A continued disengagement by large numbers of litigants from
legal processes and curial institutions is inconsistent with the equal application of the
Rule of Law. It behooves lawyers and judges to put their own houses in order. If they do
not, they risk bringing the legal system into further disrepute. Abram Chayes appreciated
that fact over 40 years ago and, I maintain, he would do so today.
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